Part IB Ethics - Henrik Røed Sherling

Links: all supervision subjects; supervision instructions.

Here are the topics, questions, and reading lists for the Part IB Ethics supervisions in the Philosophy Tripos at Cambridge. Students must choose just one question when more than one is listed. Only four topics will be covered.

1 Practical reason

Questions:

‘If people’s reasons for action depend on their desires, then people without at least some desire to be good have no reason to be good. So, people’s reasons for action don’t depend on their desires.’ Is this a good argument?

‘You are obligated to $\varphi$ only if you have reason to $\varphi$. You have reason to $\varphi$ only if you are motivated to $\varphi$. You are not motivated to $\varphi$; therefore, you are not obligated to $\varphi$.’ Discuss.

Primary reading:

Bernard Williams, ‘Internal and External Reasons’.
Kieran Setiya, ‘Against Internalism’.
Julia Markovits, ‘Why be an Internalist about Reasons?’.
Sharon Street, ‘In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference: Ideally Coherent Eccentrics and the Contingency of What Matters’.

Further reading:

Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions (chs. 1 and 6, see also chs. 5 and 11).
Bernard Williams, ‘Internal reasons and the obscurity of blame’.
John McDowell, ‘Might there be external reasons?’.
David Sobel, ‘Subjectivism and Reasons to be Moral’
Christine M. Korsgaard, ‘Skepticism about Practical Reason’
Kate Manne, ‘Internalism about reasons: sad but true?’.
Smith, ‘The Humean Theory of Motivation’ and ‘The Argument for Internalism: Reply to Miller’.

2 Early modern moral philosophy

Questions:

What grounds the normative authority of morality? Answer with reference to early modern voluntarism and rationalism.

Leibniz and Spinoza both disagree with voluntarism. Are their reasons for doing so compatible? Are they right?

At the moment (2022-2023), Spinoza is not examinable. You may still choose to read him and answer the second question, but should expect to do this on top of the primary readings.

Overview:

Schneewind, ‘Voluntarism and the Foundations of Ethics’.

Primary readings about all of the central thinkers can be found in Schneewind’s Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. Choose among chapters about

Samuel Pufendorf,
Thomas Hobbes,
Benedict de Spinoza,
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz,
Samuel Clarke, and
Francisco Suarez.

3 Helping and harming

3.1 Demands of beneficence

Questions:

‘We always ought to do what is best. So there are no “supererogatory” actions.’ Discuss.

Are there limits to the duty of beneficence?

Should you be a moral saint?

Primary reading:

Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’.
Baron, ‘Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology’.
Buss, ‘Needs (Someone Else’s), Projects (My Own), and Reasons’.
Wolf, ‘Moral Saints’.

Further reading:

Unger, ‘Living High and Letting Die: Our illusion of innocence’.
Melden, ‘Saints and Heroes’.
Herman, ‘The Scope of Moral Requirement’.
Cullity, ‘The Moral Demands of Affluence’.
Hill, ‘Meeting Needs and Doing Favors’.
Murphy, ‘The Demands of Beneficence’.
Miller, ‘Beneficence, Duty and Distance’.

3.2 Aggregation

Questions:

Other things being equal, given the choice between saving a smaller or greater number of people, you should save the greater number. However, other things being equal, given the choice between saving a life or saving many people from minor injury, you should save a life. Are these two commitments consistent?

‘There is no number of mild headaches whose relief would outweigh saving the life of an innocent person.’ Discuss.

Primary reading:

Norcross, ‘Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives’.
Scanlon, ‘The Structure of Contractualism’.
Taurek, ‘Should the Numbers Count?’.
Broome, ‘Fairness’.

Further reading:

Dougherty, ‘Rational Numbers: A Non-Consequentialist Explanation Of Why You Should Save The Many And Not The Few’.
Fried, ‘Can Contractualism Save Us from Aggregation?’.
Hirose, ‘Saving the Greater Number Without Combining Claims’.
Otsuka, ‘Saving Lives, Moral Theory, and the Claims of Individuals’.

3.3 Contractualism

Question:

Is an act permissible if it is compatible with a set of principles that no one could reasonably reject?

Primary reading:

Parfit, ‘Contractualism’.
Sen and Williams, ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’.
Scanlon, ‘What We Owe to Each Other’.
Ashford, ‘The Demandingness of Scanlon’s Contractualism’.

Further reading:

Brand‐Ballard, ‘Contractualism and Deontic Restrictions’.
Darwall, ‘The Second-person Standpoint: Morality, respect, and accountability’.
Gauthier, ‘Morals By Agreement’.
Hampton, ‘Feminist Contractarianism’.
Kumar, ‘Defending the Moral Moderate: Contractualism and Common Sense’.
Wallace, ‘Scanlon’s Contractualism’.

5 Normative powers

Questions:

How does the fact that two adults both consent to something change their normative situation?

What is required for someone’s consent to be valid?

‘You wrong another person by performing an action if they could not reasonably consent to this action.’ Is this right?

Primary reading:

Korsgaard, ‘Kant’s Formula of Humanity’.
O’Neill, ‘Between Consenting Adults’.
Beauchamp, ‘Autonomy and Consent’.
Conly, ‘Seduction, Rape, and Coercion’.
Dworkin, ‘The Theory and Practice of Autonomy’.

Further reading:

Manson, ‘How to Rethink Informed Consent’.
Owens, ‘The Possibility of Consent’.
Parfit, ‘Possible Consent’.
Scanlon, ‘The Value of Choice’.
Wertheimer, ‘Consent to Sexual Relations’.
West, ‘Sex, Law, and Consent’.

5.2 Promise

Questions:

Are you morally obligated to keep your promise to a dead person?

In virtue of what is a promise binding?

Primary reading:

Owens, ‘Shaping the Normative Landscape’.
Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’.
Scanlon, ‘Promises and Practices’.
Gilbert, ‘Scanlon on Promissory Obligation: The Problem of Promisees’.

Further reading:

Narveson, ‘Promising, Expecting, and Utility’.
Shiffrin, ‘Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism’.
Thomson, ‘Giving One’s Word’.
Watson, ‘Promises, Reasons, and Normative Powers’.
Southwood, ‘Promises Beyond Assurance’.

6 Virtue ethics

Questions:

Why should an agent be virtuous?

Even if all virtuous actions are right, are they right because they are virtuous?

Primary reading:

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Book 2, chs. 1–7; Book 6, chs. 9–11).
Alfano, ‘Character as Moral Fiction’.
Annas, ‘Intelligent Virtue’.
Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’.
Wolf, ‘Moral Psychology and the Unity of the Virtues’.

Further reading:

Alfano (Ed.), Current Controversies in Virtue Theory.
Snow, The Oxford Handbook of Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics Virtue.
Badhwar, ‘The Limited Unity of Virtue’.
Broadie, ‘The Problem of Practical Intellect in Aristotle’s Ethics’.
Doris, ‘Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics’.
Foot, ‘Virtues and Vices’.
Harman, ‘Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error’.
Hursthouse, ‘The Central Doctrine of the Mean’.
Kamtekar, ‘Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character’.
McDowell, ‘Virtue and Reason’.
Nussbaum, ‘Non‐Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach’.
Pakaluk, ‘Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: An introduction’.
Prinz, ‘The Normativity Challenge: Cultural Psychology Provides the Real Threat to Virtue Ethics’.
Railton, ‘Two Cheers for Virtue: or, Might Virtue Be Habit Forming?’.
Rorty, Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics.
Russell, ‘Phronesis and the Virtues’.
Snow, ‘Comments on Intelligent Virtue: Outsmarting Situationism’.
Sreenivasan, ‘Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution’.

Thanks to Facundo Rodríguez for help with this page.

1 Practical reason

2 Early modern moral philosophy

3 Helping and harming

3.1 Demands of beneficence

3.2 Aggregation

3.3 Contractualism

5 Normative powers

5.1 Consent

5.2 Promise

6 Virtue ethics