Links: all supervision subjects; supervision instructions.

Here are the topics, questions, and reading lists for the Part II Ethics supervisions in the Philosophy Tripos at Cambridge. Students must choose just one question when more than one is listed. Only four topics will be covered.

1 The moral circle

1.1 Animal ethics

  1. Do non-human animals have ends? What, if anything, follows from our answer to this question?
  2. EITHER (a): May we eat our fellow creatures? OR (b): Are dogs trustworthy?
  • Korsgaard CM. Fellow Creatures : Our Obligations to the Other Animals. Oxford University Press; 2018.
  • Nussbaum MC. Justice for Animals: Our Collective Responsibility. Simon & Schuster; 2023.
  • Crary A. Inside Ethics: On the Demands of Moral Thought. Harvard University Press; 2016.
  • Singer, P. Animal Liberation. Ecco Press; 2001.
  • Diamond C. Eating Meat and Eating People. Philosophy. 1978;53(206):465-479.
  • Regan T. The Case for Animal Rights. University of California Press; 2004.
  • Singer P. All Animals Are Equal. In: Regan T and PS, ed. Animal Rights and Human Obligations. 2nd ed. Prentice-Hall; 1989.

2 Kant and Kantian Ethics

  1. ‘It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world […] that could be taken to be good without limitation, except a good will’. Discuss.
  2. To have moral worth, an action must be done ‘not from inclination, but from duty’. Is this true?
  3. ‘You can tell that the Categorical Imperative is false by looking at the specific moral duties that Kant deduces from it.’ Discuss.
  4. Are Kant’s formulations of the Categorical Imperative equivalent?
  5. ‘A free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same’. Discuss.
  • Kant I. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Revised edition. (translated and edited by Gregor M and JT, ed.). Cambridge University Press; 2012.

2.1 Introductions

  • Allison HE. Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary. Oxford University Press; 2011.
  • Guyer P. The Strategy of Kant’s Groundwork. In: Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness. Cambridge University Press; 2000:201-231.
  • Timmermann J. Kants’ Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary. Cambridge University Press; 2007.
  • Velleman JD. A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics. In: Self to Self: Selected Essays. Cambridge University Press; 2006:16-44.

2.2 Duty and motive

  • Kant I. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Revised edition. (translated and edited by Gregor M and JT, ed.). Cambridge University Press; 2012. §1.
  • Baron M. Kant on Acting From Duty. In: Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology. Cornell University Press; 1999:146-187.
  • Korsgaard CM. Kant’s Analysis of Obligation: The Argument of Groundwork I. In: Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge University Press; 1996:43-76.
  • Langton R. Duty and Desolation. Philosophy. 1992;67(262):481-505.

2.3 Morality and freedom

  • Kant I. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Revised edition. (translated and edited by Gregor M and JT, ed.). Cambridge University Press; 2012. §3.
  • Allison H. The Deduction in Groundwork III. In: Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge University Press; 1990.
  • Korsgaard CM. Morality as Freedom. In: Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge University Press; 1996:159-187.

2.4 Conditioned and unconditioned value

  • Korsgaard CM. Two Distinctions in Goodness. In: Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge University Press; 1996:249-274.
  • Langton R. Objective and Unconditioned Value. The Philosophical Review. 2007;116(2):157-185.
  • Wood AW. The Formula of Humanity as End in Itself. In: Kant’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge University Press; 2006.

2.5 The categorical imperative

  • Kant I. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Revised edition. (translated and edited by Gregor M and JT, ed.). Cambridge University Press; 2012. §§1-2.

Recommended:

  • O’Neill O. Consistency in Action. In: Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Cambridge University Press; 1995:81-104.
  • O’Neill O. Universal Laws and Ends in Themselves. In: Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Cambridge University Press; 1995:126-144.

Suggested:

  • Korsgaard CM. Kant’s Formula of Humanity. In: Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge University Press; 1996:106-132.
  • Korsgaard CM. Kant’s Formula of Universal Law. In: Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge University Press; 1996:77-105.

2.6 Autonomy

  • O’Neill O. Reason and Autonomy in Grundlegung III. In: Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Cambridge University Press; 1995:51-65.

3 Moral Psychology

  1. When, if ever, is it rational to trust?
  2. Is it an instance of epistemic injustice if I dismiss the vaccine sceptic’s worries?
  3. Are there true beliefs that it is morally wrong to hold?
  4. What reasons do we have to trust?
  5. ‘Blame is only appropriate where a relationship has been impaired.’ Discuss.
  6. Can we decide to trust? What does this tell us about the nature of trust?

3.1 Trust

  • O’Neill O. A Question of Trust: The BBC Reith Lectures. Cambridge University Press; 2002.
  • O’Neill O. Justice, Trust and Accountability.; 2005.
  • Hawley K. Trust, Distrust and Commitment. Noûs. 2014;48(1):1-20.
  • Holton R. Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1994;72(1):63-76.

3.2 The ethics of knowing

  • Clifford, W. The Ethics of Belief. In: The Ethics of Belief: And Other Essays. Prometheus Books; 1999:70-96.
  • Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press; 2007.
  • Fantl J and MM. Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification. The Philosophical Review. 2002;111(1):67-94.
  • MacFarlane J. Knowledge Laundering: Testimony and Sensitive Invariantism. Analysis. 2005;65(2):132-138.

3.3 Implicit beliefs

  • Gendler TS. On the Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias. Philosophical Studies. 2011;156(1):33-63.
  • Egan A. Comments on Gendler’s, “The Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias.” Philosophical Studies. 2011;156(1):65-79.
  • Levy N. Consciousness, Implicit Attitudes and Moral Responsibility. Noûs. 2014;48(1):21-40.
  • Levy N. Neither Fish nor Fowl: Implicit Attitudes as Patchy Endorsements. Noûs. 2015;49(4):800-823.
  • Yap AS. Credibility Excess and the Social Imaginary in Cases of Sexual Assault. Feminist Philosophy Quarterly. 2017;3(4):1-24.

3.4 Responsibility

  • Strawson, PF. Freedom and Resentment. In: Freedom and Resentment: And Other Essays. Routledge; 2008:44-71.
  • Arpaly N. Moral Worth. The Journal of Philosophy. 2002;99(5):223-245.
  • Fricker M. What’s the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation. Noûs. 2016;50(1):165-183.
  • Wolf S. Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility. In: Shafer-Landau R, ed. Ethical Theory: An Anthology. 2nd ed. John Wiley & Sons; 2013:330-339.

4 Metaethics

  1. ‘Torture would be wrong even if nobody thought so. Any theory which suggests otherwise is mistaken.’ Discuss.
  2. EITHER (a): Is there anything distinctively difficult about attaining ethical knowledge? OR (b): Does neuroscience have anything useful to tell us about metaethics?
  3. ‘Evolutionary forces have played a large role in shaping the content of human evaluative attitudes.’ Assuming this is true, how should it change how we think about ethics?
  4. Value is either an attribute or a relation. If it is a relation, then nothing is intrinsically valuable. Some things are intrinsically valuable. Therefore, value is an attribute.’ Is this a good argument?
  5. Does ethical discourse have ontological commitments?
  6. ‘Scientific concepts aim to represent reality; moral concepts don’t.’ Discuss.

4.1 General

  • Darwall S. Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics: Some Trends. The Philosophical Review. 1992;101(1):115-189.
  • Korsgaard CM. Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth‐Century Moral Philosophy. In: The Constitution of Agency. Oxford University Press; 2008:302-326.

4.2 Realism, naturalist or not

  • Brink DO. A Posteriori Objections to Moral Realism. In: Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press; 1989.
  • Horgan T and Timmons M. New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth. Journal of Philosophical Research. 1991;16:447-465.
  • Cuneo T. The Parity Premise. In: The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism. Oxford University Press; 2012:3-28.
  • Enoch, David. The Argument from the Deliberative Indispensability of Irreducibly Normative Truths. In: Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. Oxford University Press; 2011.
  • Shafer-Landau R. Moral Realism: a Defence. Clarendon Press; 2003.

4.3 Constructivism

  • Enoch D. Can There Be a Global, Interesting, Coherent Constructivism about Practical Reason? Philosophical Explorations. 2009;12(3):319-339.
  • Korsgaard CM. The Authority of Reflection. In: The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press; 1996.
  • Smith M. Dispositional Theories of Value. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume. 1989;63(1):113-137.
  • Street S. Coming to Terms with Contingency: Humean Constructivism About Practical Reason. In: Lenman J and YS, ed. Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press; 2014:40-59.

4.4 Expressivism

  • Dreier J. Meta-Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism. Philosophical Perspectives. 2004;18(1):23-44.
  • Gibbard A. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. In: Darwall S, ed. Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches. Oxford University Press; 1997:179-198.
  • Price H. Pragmatism, Quasi-Realism, and the Global Challenge. In: Naturalism Without Mirrors. Oxford University Press; 2011.
  • Schroeder MA. Noncognitivism in Ethics. Routledge; 2010. https://idiscover.lib.cam.ac.uk/permalink/f/5hbpu5/44CAM_ALMA51622129760003606

4.5 Error theory

  • Mackie JL. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Penguin Books; 1977.
  • Joyce R. The Myth of Morality. Cambridge University Press; 2001.
  • Olson J. Moral Error Theory, and Then What? In: Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. Oxford University Press; 2014.

4.6 Moral epistemology

  • Williams B. Knowledge, Science, Convergence. In: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Fontana; 1985.
  • Putnam H. Objectivity and the Science-Ethics Distinction. In: Nussbaum M and AS, ed. The Quality of Life. Clarendon Press; 1996:143-157.
  • Heal J. Ethics and the Absolute Conception. Philosophy. 1989;64(247):49-65.
  • Roberts D. Thick Concepts. Philosophy Compass. 2013;8(8):677-688.

4.6.1 Evolution and debunking

  • Street S. A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value. Philosophical Studies. 2006;127(1):109-166.
  • Berker S. The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 2009;37(4):293-329.
  • Hanson L. The Real Problem With Evolutionary Debunking Arguments. The Philosophical Quarterly. 2017;67(268):508-533.
  • Clarke-Doane J. Moral Epistemology: The Mathematics Analogy. Noûs. 2014;48(2):238-255.
  • Srinivasan A. The Archimedean Urge. Philosophical Perspectives. 2015;29.

4.6.2 Disagreement

  • Enoch D. How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism? The Journal of Ethics. 2008;13(1):15-50.
  • Hills A. Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology. Ethics. 2009;120(1):94-127.
  • Hopkins R. What is Wrong with Moral Testimony? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2007;74(3):611-634.
  • Sliwa P. Moral Understanding as Knowing Right From Wrong. Ethics. 2017;127(3):521-552.